Amended Standing Provisions of Proposition 64 Relate To Pending Cases
Posted by Kendra D. Miller
Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, 2006 DJDAR 9607 (Cal. July 24, 2006)
The California Supreme Court held that the amended standing provisions of Business and Professions Code section 17200 that were approved by Proposition 64 apply to cases already pending when Proposition 64 took effect.
Californians for Disability Rights (CDR), a nonprofit corporation, filed a lawsuit against Mervyn’s alleging that Mervyn’s failed to provide adequate pathway space for persons with mobility disabilities. CDR did not claim to have suffered any harm as a result of Mervyn’s conduct but instead purported to sue on behalf of the general public. A trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mervyn’s on February 2, 2004. CDR appealed. While the appeal was pending, Californian voters passed Proposition 64 on November 2, 2004, which limited private enforcement of unfair business competition laws to people who have suffered an injury and who have lost money or property. Mervyn’s moved to dismiss CDR’s appeal, arguing that Proposition 64 eliminated CDR’s standing to prosecute the action. The court of appeal denied the motion, holding that the standing provisions did not apply to cases pending when Proposition 64 took effect.
The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Before Proposition 64, anybody acting in the interest of itself, its members, or the general public could bring suit under California’s unfair competition laws. Proposition 64 changed the standing requirements, thereby limiting private enforcement actions. In deciding whether a law is prospective or retroactive, function is examined, not form. The law’s effect on a party’s rights and liabilities is considered. Proposition 64 did not change the substantive rules governing business and competitive conduct, nor did it eliminate any right to recover. Rather, it only limited standing to those persons who have suffered injury. To apply Proposition 64’s standing provisions to this case and other pending cases is not to apply them “retroactively” as the Court has defined that term “because the measure does not change the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities based on such conduct.”